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Appellants, Dianna Espinoza ("Espinoza") and Paige Hunsaker ("Hunsaker"),
respectfully submit this Reply Brief of Appellants in response to the Brief of Appellee filed
by Gold Cross Services, Inc., d.b.a. Gold Cross Ambulance ("Gold Cross").
ARGUMENT
1. IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT ESPINOZA AND HUNSAKER
REQUESTED THEIR OWN MEDICAL RECORDS.
Gold Cross's arguments regarding the nature of Espinoza's and Hunsaker's requests
for their medical records are based on a false premise. That premise is that they are not
entitled to copies at a reasonable cost-based fee for one simple reason: their records were
mailed to them at their attorney's office. Throughout its brief, Gold Cross builds this
argument and attempts to shift this Court's focus from the proper inquiry of whether its
patients requested their records to where its patients requested they receive their records.
Gold Cross advances its premise by ignoring the plain language of 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.524(c)(4) which focuses solely on who requested the records:
If an individual requests a copy of the protected health information or agrees
to a summary or explanation of such information, the covered entity may
impose a reasonable, cost-based fee, provided that the fee includes only the
cost of:
(i) Copying, including the cost of supplies for and labor of copying, the
protected health information requested by the individual; [and]
(ii) Postage, when the individual has requested the copy, of the summary or
explanation, be mailed. . . .
(Emphasis added.) On its face, it is clear that the regulation does not even consider where
the patient wants to receive the records.
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Gold Cross also advances its false premise by attempting to ignore critical facts. For
example, it completely sidesteps the core factual issue of whether Espinoza and Hunsaker
personally requested their records:
Appellants contend that because they requested their medical records for their
use and directed that these records be sent to them at their attorney's office,
they were the 'intended recipients' of the request to Gold Cross and, therefore,
Appellants' requested their medical records as individuals under the applicable
DHHS regulations. (AOBat6, 14.) This, however, is not a disputedfact; the
nature of Appellants' request to Gold Cross under the DHHS regulations is
a matter of law.
Brief of Appellee at 5 (emphasis added). Not so. Gold Cross' efforts to avoid the factual
issue of whether Espinoza and Hunsaker requested their records is misplaced. The amount
it can charge for medical records under 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(4) depends entirely on who
requested them. Thus, its claim that "there is no dispute as to any fact - material or
otherwise" is only true to the extent it is conceding the dispositive fact that Espinoza and
Hunsaker requested their records as individuals, as they have always maintained. Brief of
Appellee at 6.
Similarly, the premise that this Court should focus not on who requested the records,
but on where the records were received, is not supported by the cases on which Gold Cross
relies. This is clear in Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir.
2007) where the court noted the dispositive fact that "Kirk Webb's lawyers-the law firm of
Mann & Cook-requested Webb's records

" Id. at 1080. Based on that critical fact, the

court applied the proper analysis and held that "the HIPAA regulations require the reduced
2

rate only when the individual himself requests the records." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly,
in Bugarin v. Chart One, Inc., 38 Cal Rptr. 3d 505, 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 206), it was
dispositive that "the request for Bugarin's medical records was made by the law firm of
Mann & Cook, not by Bugarin personally."
In its quest to have this Court focus only on where its patients received their records,
Gold Cross completely ignores what its Patient's Authorizations actually say. On their face,
they are clearly requests for records by and from patients, not third-parties. {Espinoza R. at
154-5 and Hunsaker R. at 143-4.) The fact that in addition to requesting their records,
Espinoza and Hunsaker directed that their records be sent to them where they could review
and use them in conjunction with their attorney is beside the point. The authority relied on
by Gold Cross makes this clear.
Regardless of Gold Cross' insistence that this case should turn on where its patients
directed that their records be sent, in its brief, it admits that "[a]fter receiving these payments
[the $30.00 flat fee paid in protest by Espinoza and Husaker], Gold Cross promptly provided
copies of the Appellants' medical records. . . ." Brief of Appellee's at 5. Therefore,
Espinoza and Hunsaker actually received their medical records exactly as they requested
them. This fact is not disputed anywhere in the record.
In summary, the threshold issue is whether the trial court erroneously found that the
"facts do not show that Plaintiffs were seeking their medical records as individuals."
{Espinoza R. at 492.) That finding was erroneous. Gold Cross admits (as it must) that there
3

are no facts in dispute as to who requested the records; it only disputes who received them.
Brief of Appellee at 5. This undisputed fact is dispositive of the threshold issue because
Espinoza and Hunsaker personally requested their records. The disputed fact does not raise
a genuine issue because they also eventually received their records as requested.
Therefore, on this threshold point, the trial court's ruling granting Gold Cross' motion
must be reversed and Espinoza's and Hunsaker's cross motion should be granted.
2. GOLD CROSS WAS UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY HOLDING
ESPINOZA'S AND HUNSAKER'S MEDICAL RECORDS HOSTAGE.
It is undisputed that Gold Cross demanded and received $30.00 from both Espinoza
and Hunsaker before it would release copies of their records. Each of their records consisted
of three pages. (EspinozaR. at 112, 150-69 and Hunsaker R. at 107, 188-90.) Because bills
were included with the records themselves, the envelopes showed postage costs of $0.37 and
$0.60, respectively. (EspinozaR. at 112, 137-9, 151, 159-62 and Hunsaker R. at 107, 13032, 155-6 188-90.) Espinoza and Hunsaker paid the demanded flat fee under protest.
Gold Cross raises two challenges to Espinoza's and Hunsaker's unjust enrichment
claim. First, it correctly notes that Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 ("HIPAA") does not provide a private statutory cause of action. Second, it argues that
Espinoza's and Hunsaker's claims for unjust enrichment cannot be maintained because there
was no agreement between the parties. These arguments will be addressed in turn.

4

Gold Cross is correct in its assertion that HIPAA does not provide a private cause of
action. This case, however, was not brought under HIPAA. This case is based on the well
recognized equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. Importantly, the unjust enrichment claim
is not preempted by HIPAA because HIPAA preempts only certain "contrary provisions of
State law." 42 U.S.C. §1320d-7; 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.202, 203. Espinoza's and Hunsaker's
unjust enrichment claims are not contrary to HIPAA.
Gold Cross also acknowledges that the "only two cases to substantively address . . .
[HIPAA's copying] fee limitation provision . . . [in the context of state law claims] were
Webb... [and] Bugarin." Brief of Appellee at 12, n. 13. Both of these cases, however, were
decided based on the dispositive fact that a law firm, not a patient, requested its clients'
records. Only the Webb opinion addressed the fact that there is no private cause of action
under HIPAA. The Webb court found that the state law claims brought in that case were not
preempted. Webb, at 1083. The Bugarin court simply recognized that the alleged HIPAA
violation was a "factual predicate" to the state law claims. Bugarin, at 507.
A single case is cited by Gold Cross for the unrelated proposition that "because [a]
claim for unjust enrichment is 'merely a recharacterization of the claim for benefits' it is
'barred by the preemptive effect of ERISA's legislative scheme.'" Brief of Appellee at 14.
That case, Peach v. Ultramar Diamond Shamrock, 229 F. Supp. 759,771 (E.D. Mich. 2002),
is obviously an ERISA benefits case and is completely distinguishable.
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In Peach, an employee became involved in his employer's acquisition by another
company. During the acquisition, oral promises regarding severance benefits were made by
his original employer which were allegedly not kept by the new employer. The employee
filed suit contending that he was wrongfully denied benefits under an employee welfare plan
as defined by ERISA. The court observed that "[a]n unjust enrichment claim seeking the
disbursement of benefits is preempted because it is, in essence, one for benefits that 'relates
to' the Plan and it does not fall under the rubric of 'other appropriate equitable relief which
ERISA allows. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)." Peach, at 770.
Gold Cross's reliance on Webb, Bugarin, and Peach in support of its HIPAA
preemption argument is misplaced.
The final argument raised by Gold Cross to defeat Espinoza's and Hunsaker's unjust
enrichment claim is that there was no "agreement between the parties" to obtain medical
records for anything less than $30.00. Brief of Appellee at 15. In support of this argument,
Gold Cross relies on Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), claiming: "Without
such an agreement - express or implied, understanding, or even a promise between the
parties, Appellants cannot bring a claim for quasi-contract or unjust enrichment." Brief of
Appellee at 15. Again, Gold Cross's reliance on case law is misplaced.
It is true that no express, written contract existed between Espinoza or Hunsaker and
Gold Cross relating to the requests for copies of the medical records. {Espinoza R. at 118
and Hunsaker R. at 114.) However, Knight v. Post does not require any kind of a contract
6

or agreement between the parties when a claim arises under the equitable doctrine of unjust
enrichment. The Utah Court of Appeals addressed unjust enrichment as follows:
In Davies v Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this Court has
identified two branches of quantum meruit: (1) contracts implied in law, also
known as quasi-contracts or unjust enrichment, which are not actions to
enforce a contract but are actually actions to require restitution, and (2)
contracts implied in fact which are contracts established by conduct.
Knight, at 1100 (emphasis added). Gold Cross overlooked this emphasized language when
it assumed that a quasi-contract must exist to give rise to Espinoza's and Hunsaker's unjust
enrichment claim.
While no such contract existed, nor was needed to bring this action, it is apparent that
there was nonetheless an "understanding" between the parties.l That understanding is based
on the following undisputed facts which gave rise to this suit: First, Espinoza and Hunsaker
submitted their Patient's Authorizations in which they promised to pay a reasonable costbased fee for copies of their records. Second, Gold Cross refused their offers and held their
records hostage. Third, both patients were then forced to confer a benefit on Gold Cross by
paying the demanded $30.00 flat fee. Espinoza sent a personal money order under protest
and Hunsaker sent a personal check under protest. Fourth, Gold Cross knowingly demanded
and accepted these benefits before it released its respective patients' three page records.

1

In any event, Gold Cross would seem to be content if there was an "understanding":
"Without such an agreement - express or implied, understanding, or even a promise between
the parties, Appellants cannot bring a claim for quasi-contract or unjust enrichment." Brief
of Appellee at 15 (emphasis added).
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Fifth, Gold Cross thereafter retained these benefits even though they were conferred on it by
its patients under circumstances making its retention of them inequitable.
The elements of unjust enrichment are thus satisfied. See American Towers Owners
Assoc, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996). Furthermore, the
elements of unjust enrichment are satisfied based on undisputed facts, including the fact that
Gold Cross understood that its patients had paid under protest and reserved the right to sue
it for holding their records hostage.2
Gold Cross does not dispute any of these facts. Indeed, it maintains that "there is no
dispute as to any fact - material or otherwise." Brief of Appellee at 6. And nowhere in the
record does it dispute the fact that the $0.25 per page amount offered by Espinoza and
Hunsaker for their records was, at least, a reasonable cost-based fee as contemplated by
HIPPA. Therefore, Gold Cross was unjustly enriched at the expense of its patients in the
amount of $30.00, less the reasonable cost-based fee of copying their records. That amount
is $0.75, or less, plus postage.
Based on this record, Espinoza's and Hunsaker's cross motion for summary judgment
should be granted.

2

Interestingly, Gold Cross refunded the $30.00 payment to Espinoza, but then sent
a $30.00 invoice to her attorney. {Espinoza R. at 95, 119.) In response, Gold Cross was
notified that Espinoza's attorney would pay that amount under protest and later seek
reimbursement from her. {Espinoza R. at 120, 166.) As required, Espinoza subsequently
reimbursed her attorney $30.00. {Espinoza R. at 120, 168.) Gold Cross never attempted to
reimburse Hunsaker in this manner.
8

CONCLUSION
Based on these undisputed facts, the trial court should have granted Espinoza's and
Hunsaker's motions and denied Gold Cross' motion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court should be reversed in part3 and judgment should be entered in favor of Espinoza and
Hunsaker with an order that Gold Cross return the amount it was unjustly enriched to them.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of November, 2009.
HOOLB & KING, L.C.

Roger H. Hoole
Attorneys lor Appellants,
Dianna Espinoza and Paige Hunsaker

3

Appellants have not argued on appeal that the trial court erred when granting Gold
Cross' motion for summary judgment on their Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act claim.
Accordingly, that issue need not be resolved until another day.
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